| IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B. APPEAL OF: T.B. No. 1775 EDA 2008 2010 PA Super 197 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 10/26/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Dispositional Order of June 12, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court Division, at No. 651-08-02, 649-08-02, Petition # 270-08-03, 653-08-02, 645-08-02. | |
| Before: BOWES, OLSON, and FREEDBERG, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: BOWES, J. | |
| This is an appeal from the dispositional order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County entered following Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency based on his commission of acts constituting four incidents each of burglary, conspiracy, possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”), and one instance of receiving stolen property (“RSP”). We reverse and remand. | |
Showing posts with label Miranda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Miranda. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B. APPEAL OF: T.B.
Labels:
Bowes,
Family Court,
Freedberg,
Miranda,
Olson,
parental rights,
Suppression,
waiver
Friday, August 28, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ARNALDO TORRES SANTIAGO
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ARNALDO TORRES SANTIAGO No. 446 EDA 2008 2009 PA Super 169 Atlantic: 980 A.2d 659 Filed: 8/28/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2007, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-51-CR-0802161-2006. | |
| Before: BENDER, SHOGAN, JJ. and McEWEN, P.J.E. | |
| Opinion by: SHOGAN, J. | |
| Appellant, Arnaldo Torres Santiago, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of first degree murder, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), and two counts of violating the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”). Appellant challenges, inter alia, the admission of the murder weapon and a witness statement obtained as a result of Appellant’s suppressed confession to police. We affirm. | |
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Labels:
14th Amendment,
1st degree murder,
5th Amendment,
Bender,
Confession,
Criminal,
McEwen,
Miranda,
PIC,
Shogan
Friday, July 17, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE GONZALEZ
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSE GONZALEZ No. 753 MDA 2008 2009 PA Super 137 Atlantic: 979 A.2d 879 Filed: 7/17/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of March 19, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-38-CR-0001010-2007. | |
| Before: BOWES, SHOGAN and KELLY, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: BOWES, J. | |
| Dissenting Opinion by: KELLY, J. | |
| Appellant, Jose Gonzalez, appeals from the judgment of sentence of three to six years incarceration imposed on March 19, 2008, following his conviction at a bench trial of possession of cocaine, possession of heroin, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm. | |
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Labels:
Bench trial,
Bowes,
Criminal,
Kelly,
Miranda,
possession,
Shogan,
Suppression
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSEPHY ALBERTO VENTURA
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSEPHY ALBERTO VENTURA No. 697 MDA 2008 2009 PA Super 96 Atlantic: 975 A.2d 1128 Filed: 5/26/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 13, 2007, Court of Common Pleas, Centre County, Criminal Division at No. CP-14-CR-0000651-2006 | |
| Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., STEVENS and DONOHUE, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: DONOHUE, J. | |
| Josephy Alberto Ventura (“Ventura”) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on November 13, 2007, following his conviction for third-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). The conviction stemmed from an incident on February 17, 2006, at Club Love, a bar in State College, Pennsylvania, in which Michael Donahue (“Victim”) died following a single stab to the heart. After careful consideration, we affirm. | |
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Labels:
3rd Degree,
Criminal,
Donohue,
Ford Elliot,
Miranda,
Murder,
Sentencing,
Stevens
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Superior Court - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RHANEL ROBERTS
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RHANEL ROBERTS No. 693 EDA 2008 2009 PA Super 56 Atlantic: 969 A.2d 594 Filed: 3/31/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2008 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal at No(s): CP-51-CR-00002619-2007, CP-51-CR-1003541-2005, CP-51-CR-1003551-2005, CP-51-CR-1003561-2005 | |
| Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., ALLEN, and FREEDBERG, JJ | |
| Opinion by: FREEDBERG, J. | |
| The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered on February 1, 2008, which granted the motion to suppress evidence filed by Appellee Rhanel Roberts. After review, we reverse and remand. | |
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Labels:
Allen,
Confession,
Criminal,
Ford Elliot,
Freedberg,
Miranda,
Statute of Limitations,
Suppression
Friday, December 19, 2008
Superior Court - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MELISSA DEE BAKER
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MELISSA DEE BAKER No. 1785 EDA 2007 2008 PA Super 288 Atlantic: 963 A.2d 495 Filed: 12/19/2008 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 20, 2007 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000582-2006 | |
| Before: STEVENS, FREEDBERG, and POPOVICH, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: STEVENS, J. | |
| Melissa Baker challenges a February 20, 2007 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. We affirm. | |
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Labels:
Aggravated Assault,
Child abuse,
Criminal,
Freedberg,
Miranda,
Popovich,
Stevens
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Superior ciurt - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAY MICHAEL BOYER, JR.
| COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAY MICHAEL BOYER, JR. No. 523 MDA 2008 2008 PA Super 279 Atlantic: 962 A.2d 1213 Filed: 12/10/2008 | |
| Appeal from the PCRA Order of March 7, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County, Criminal Division at No. CP-60-CR-0000027-2002 | |
| Before: ORIE MELVIN, SHOGAN and COLVILLE, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: COLVILLE, J. | |
| This case is an appeal from the order denying Appellant’s petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in not finding his trial counsel ineffective in the following ways: (1) by not objecting when the Commonwealth introduced the guilty plea of one of Appellant’s codefendants and by not requesting an instruction that the jury could not find Appellant guilty merely because of his codefendant’s plea; (2) by not litigating the issue of a Miranda violation with respect to Appellant’s confession; (3) by not requesting an instruction that the jurors could not consider Appellant’s confession as evidence unless they determined it was voluntary; (4) by not requesting an instruction that the jury should view Appellant’s confession with caution. | |
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Labels:
Colville,
Confession,
Criminal,
Miranda,
Orie Melvin,
PCRA,
Shogan
Thursday, May 8, 2008
Superior Court 5/8/08 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RAFAEL THEVENIN
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RAFAEL THEVENIN
No. 3420 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 96 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 5/8/2008
Appeal from the Order dated November 2, 2006In the Court of Common Pleas of PhiladelphiaCounty, Criminal, No. 0512-0316 1/1
Before: KLEIN, GANTMAN and ALLEN, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s order suppressing drugs found in a house after Defendant Rafael Thevenin agreed to disclose the location of the drugs when confronted with a search warrant and a police statement that he could avoid a destructive search of the house by revealing where the drugs were located. The trial court held that because Thevenin was not given his Miranda warnings, learning of the location of the stash was the fruit of an improper statement. The Commonwealth asserts that while any statement Thevenin made in response to the police is properly suppressed, the physical evidence discovered is not. We agree with the Commonwealth and reverse.
Following Commonwealth v. Abbas, 862 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. 2004) and United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), merely because a voluntary statement was not preceded by Miranda warnings does not require the suppression of physical evidence found pursuant to the statement. Also, we will not upset the trial court’s determination that under the circumstances
the discovery of the drugs would not have been inevitable.......
..... It is conceded that no Miranda warnings were given to Thevenin before he was asked if he wanted the police to do a full search of the house or if he wanted to reveal where the drugs were hidden. It is further conceded by the Commonwealth that the statement about the location was inadmissible. However, case law indicates that these concessions do not require the suppression of the tangible objects discovered in the search.
Preliminarily, we note that we want to encourage the police to give a defendant or others that live with a defendant the opportunity to avoid a major disturbance to his or her house prior to an invasive search. Of course, nothing about this encouragement is lessened if the police gave the Miranda warnings prior to the request. We are simply noting that the prevention of unnecessary disturbance or destruction of property is a proper goal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted this same goal in United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).
Although Crespo de Llano was decided under Fifth Amendment principles, the federal court nonetheless realized that police, when possessing a valid search warrant, have the inherent power to search for contraband that has been hidden. While some criminals leave the evidence of their wrongdoing in plain view, not all criminals are so accommodating. The law recognizes this fact and allows the police fair latitude in searching for hidden contraband. Statements such as the one in question here inform the person affected by the search of that latitude and offer that person the opportunity to avoid the disturbance of the property that is otherwise allowed by the law. Giving a suspect this opportunity strikes us as laudatory policy rather than requiring the police to hold their tongues and letting the chips fall as they may.
While policy favors allowing the police to give the defendant the opportunity to cooperate and avoid possible property destruction, the more important aspect of the issue is whether a Miranda warning is required prior to offering the opportunity to cooperate and what happens if a Miranda warning is not given prior to the offer.....
No. 3420 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 96 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 5/8/2008
Appeal from the Order dated November 2, 2006In the Court of Common Pleas of PhiladelphiaCounty, Criminal, No. 0512-0316 1/1
Before: KLEIN, GANTMAN and ALLEN, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s order suppressing drugs found in a house after Defendant Rafael Thevenin agreed to disclose the location of the drugs when confronted with a search warrant and a police statement that he could avoid a destructive search of the house by revealing where the drugs were located. The trial court held that because Thevenin was not given his Miranda warnings, learning of the location of the stash was the fruit of an improper statement. The Commonwealth asserts that while any statement Thevenin made in response to the police is properly suppressed, the physical evidence discovered is not. We agree with the Commonwealth and reverse.
Following Commonwealth v. Abbas, 862 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. 2004) and United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), merely because a voluntary statement was not preceded by Miranda warnings does not require the suppression of physical evidence found pursuant to the statement. Also, we will not upset the trial court’s determination that under the circumstances
the discovery of the drugs would not have been inevitable.......
..... It is conceded that no Miranda warnings were given to Thevenin before he was asked if he wanted the police to do a full search of the house or if he wanted to reveal where the drugs were hidden. It is further conceded by the Commonwealth that the statement about the location was inadmissible. However, case law indicates that these concessions do not require the suppression of the tangible objects discovered in the search.
Preliminarily, we note that we want to encourage the police to give a defendant or others that live with a defendant the opportunity to avoid a major disturbance to his or her house prior to an invasive search. Of course, nothing about this encouragement is lessened if the police gave the Miranda warnings prior to the request. We are simply noting that the prevention of unnecessary disturbance or destruction of property is a proper goal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted this same goal in United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).
Although Crespo de Llano was decided under Fifth Amendment principles, the federal court nonetheless realized that police, when possessing a valid search warrant, have the inherent power to search for contraband that has been hidden. While some criminals leave the evidence of their wrongdoing in plain view, not all criminals are so accommodating. The law recognizes this fact and allows the police fair latitude in searching for hidden contraband. Statements such as the one in question here inform the person affected by the search of that latitude and offer that person the opportunity to avoid the disturbance of the property that is otherwise allowed by the law. Giving a suspect this opportunity strikes us as laudatory policy rather than requiring the police to hold their tongues and letting the chips fall as they may.
While policy favors allowing the police to give the defendant the opportunity to cooperate and avoid possible property destruction, the more important aspect of the issue is whether a Miranda warning is required prior to offering the opportunity to cooperate and what happens if a Miranda warning is not given prior to the offer.....
Labels:
Criminal,
Klein,
Miranda,
Suppression,
Warrant
Thursday, January 3, 2008
Superior Court 1/3/2008 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA vs. HOPE L. WILLIAMS -
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA vs. HOPE L. WILLIAMS
No. 827 WDA 2006 2008 PA Super 6 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 1/3/2008
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 5, 2006 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal, No. 920 Criminal 2005
Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, BOWES, GANTMAN, McCAFFERY, AND DANIELS, JJ.
Opinion by: GANTMAN, J.
Appellant, Hope L. Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, following her convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and careless driving . Specifically, Appellant asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it denied her omnibus pre-trial suppression motion, where there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI, and her incriminating statements were elicited before she was given proper Miranda warnings. We are also asked to decide whether the court has the statutory authority to impose a sentence under the Intermediate Punishment Program (“IPP”), in light of the mandatory sentencing provisions of the DUI statute, which call for a fixed term of imprisonment. We hold, under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI; Appellant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when she made incriminating statements; and the court had the statutory authority and discretion to sentence Appellant to IPP, if both Appellant and the program qualified. Accordingly, we affirm.
No. 827 WDA 2006 2008 PA Super 6 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 1/3/2008
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 5, 2006 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal, No. 920 Criminal 2005
Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, LALLY-GREEN, TODD, BOWES, GANTMAN, McCAFFERY, AND DANIELS, JJ.
Opinion by: GANTMAN, J.
Appellant, Hope L. Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, following her convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and careless driving . Specifically, Appellant asks us to determine whether the trial court erred when it denied her omnibus pre-trial suppression motion, where there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI, and her incriminating statements were elicited before she was given proper Miranda warnings. We are also asked to decide whether the court has the statutory authority to impose a sentence under the Intermediate Punishment Program (“IPP”), in light of the mandatory sentencing provisions of the DUI statute, which call for a fixed term of imprisonment. We hold, under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI; Appellant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when she made incriminating statements; and the court had the statutory authority and discretion to sentence Appellant to IPP, if both Appellant and the program qualified. Accordingly, we affirm.
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