Superior Court - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO GUTIERREZ

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTONIO GUTIERREZ No. 710 and 806 MDA 2008 2009 PA Super 55 Atlantic: 969 A.2d 584 Filed: 3/30/2009
	Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 2, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-06-CR-0000329-2007.
Before: BOWES, SHOGAN and KELLY, JJ.
Opinion by: BOWES, J.
Antonio Gutierrez and the Commonwealth have both filed appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed in this case. The Commonwealth complains about the sentencing court’s failure to impose a mandatory minimum sentence that it contends is applicable herein. Gutierrez, who we will refer to as Appellant, assails the adequacy of the warrant utilized to search his residence and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of a prohibited offensive weapon. We reject the allegations of error raised by Appellant, but conclude that the Commonwealth’s position is meritorious. We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

-----------------------------------------------------
Want 50 state & federal case law? - click here

Superior Court - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. HAKIM JOHNSON

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. HAKIM JOHNSON No. 3395 EDA 2006 2009 PA Super 41 Atlantic: 969 A.2d 565 Filed: 3/11/2009
	Appeal from the Order entered November 1, 2006 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal No. CP-51-CR-1107921-2005
Before: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD, JJ.
Opinion by: FITZGERALD, J.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the motion to suppress filed by Appellee, Hakim Johnson. We find that the need to identify an unconscious victim, in order to facilitate investigation of the attack, can be an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search of the victim’s clothing. We specifically hold that the instant, warrantless search was justified when the police had no reason to believe that Appellee had committed a crime. As a result, we conclude that the suppression court erred as a matter of law in relying on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Silo, 509 Pa. 406, 502 A.2d 173 (1985) (Silo II), and Commonwealth v. Silo, 480 Pa. 15, 389 A.2d 62 (1978) (Silo I), because the facts of those cases are distinguishable from the instant facts. Accordingly, we reverse the order suppressing the contraband inadvertently found in Appellee’s discarded clothing.

-----------------------------------------------------
Want 50 state & federal case law? - click here

Superior Court 8/7/08 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. YUSUF COPELAND

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. YUSUF COPELAND
No. 2866 EDA 2007 2008 PA Super 180 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 8/7/2008
Appeal from the Order entered October 22, 2007In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware CountyCriminal, No. CP-23-CR-0002554-2007
Before: BOWES, GANTMAN, AND TAMILIA, JJ.
Opinion by: GANTMAN, J.
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which granted a motion to suppress the Commonwealth’s evidence, filed on behalf of Appellee, Yusuf Copeland. We reverse the court’s suppression order and remand for further proceedings.

-----------------------------------------------------
Want 50 state & federal case law? - click here


The Commonwealth now raises three issues for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUPPRESSION CONSTITUTES LEGAL ERROR WHERE THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE POLICE SEIZED ITEMS WITHIN THE AUTOMOBILE BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUPPRESSION CONSTITUTES LEGAL ERROR WHERE THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH FOR WEAPONS WAS LAWFUL UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUPPRESSION CONSTITUTES LEGAL ERROR WHERE THE MARIJUANA RECOVERED FROM THE VEHICLE WAS SEIZED IN PLAIN VIEW?

Superior Court 7/3/08 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GREGORY WALLACE

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GREGORY WALLACE
No. 3546 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 144 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/3/2008
Appeal from the Order entered November 21, 2006 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal at No(s): 0606-0839 1/1
Before: STEVENS, KLEIN, and POPOVICH, JJ.
Opinion by: STEVENS, J.
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on November 21, 2006, granting the motion to suppress of Appellee, Gregory Wallace. Herein, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion in that the search warrant in question was supported by probable cause. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings.



¶ 7 Pa.R.Crim.P. 203 provides, in pertinent part, that:
A search warrant may be issued in anticipation of a
prospective event as long as the warrant is based upon an
affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time, but
not currently, certain evidence of a crime will be located at a
specified place.
Pa.R.Cri.P. 203(F).
¶ 8 It is well-settled that “in determining whether probable cause for
issuance of a warrant is present a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test” is
employed. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 916 A.2d 679, 681-682 (Pa.Super.
2007). This Court has noted that: “Under such a standard, the task of the
issuing authority is to make a practical, common sense assessment whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” Id. at 682 (citation omitted). In Commonwealth v.
West, 937 A.2d 516 (Pa.Super. 2007), this Court reiterated the above
standard, adding that “[p]robable cause does not require a prima facie
showing of criminal activity.” Id. at 530 (citation omitted). See
Commonwealth v. Gannon, 454 A.2d 561, 565 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“The
critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property
J. A11010/08
- 5 -
is suspected of crime but that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”) (citation
omitted).
¶ 9 The Supreme Court has explained that “[p]robable cause is a
‘practical, nontechnical conception:’ it ‘is a fluid concept -- turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” Commonwealth v. Glass,
562 Pa. 187, 201, 754 A.2d 655, 663 (2000) (citations omitted). “[T]he
notion of probable cause [is] based on ‘the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act.’” Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 483, 503
A.2d 921, 925 (1985), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
¶ 10 Moreover, we note that “[a] reviewing court may not conduct a de
novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination. The
role of both the reviewing court and the appellate court is confined to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting
the decision to issue the warrant.” Commonwealth v. Huntington, 924
A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

-----------------------------------------------------
Want 50 state & federal case law? - click here

Superior Court 5/8/08 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RAFAEL THEVENIN

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RAFAEL THEVENIN
No. 3420 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 96 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 5/8/2008
Appeal from the Order dated November 2, 2006In the Court of Common Pleas of PhiladelphiaCounty, Criminal, No. 0512-0316 1/1
Before: KLEIN, GANTMAN and ALLEN, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s order suppressing drugs found in a house after Defendant Rafael Thevenin agreed to disclose the location of the drugs when confronted with a search warrant and a police statement that he could avoid a destructive search of the house by revealing where the drugs were located. The trial court held that because Thevenin was not given his Miranda warnings, learning of the location of the stash was the fruit of an improper statement. The Commonwealth asserts that while any statement Thevenin made in response to the police is properly suppressed, the physical evidence discovered is not. We agree with the Commonwealth and reverse.


Following Commonwealth v. Abbas, 862 A.2d 606 (Pa. Super. 2004) and United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), merely because a voluntary statement was not preceded by Miranda warnings does not require the suppression of physical evidence found pursuant to the statement. Also, we will not upset the trial court’s determination that under the circumstances
the discovery of the drugs would not have been inevitable.......

..... It is conceded that no Miranda warnings were given to Thevenin before he was asked if he wanted the police to do a full search of the house or if he wanted to reveal where the drugs were hidden. It is further conceded by the Commonwealth that the statement about the location was inadmissible. However, case law indicates that these concessions do not require the suppression of the tangible objects discovered in the search.

Preliminarily, we note that we want to encourage the police to give a defendant or others that live with a defendant the opportunity to avoid a major disturbance to his or her house prior to an invasive search. Of course, nothing about this encouragement is lessened if the police gave the Miranda warnings prior to the request. We are simply noting that the prevention of unnecessary disturbance or destruction of property is a proper goal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted this same goal in United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).

Although Crespo de Llano was decided under Fifth Amendment principles, the federal court nonetheless realized that police, when possessing a valid search warrant, have the inherent power to search for contraband that has been hidden. While some criminals leave the evidence of their wrongdoing in plain view, not all criminals are so accommodating. The law recognizes this fact and allows the police fair latitude in searching for hidden contraband. Statements such as the one in question here inform the person affected by the search of that latitude and offer that person the opportunity to avoid the disturbance of the property that is otherwise allowed by the law. Giving a suspect this opportunity strikes us as laudatory policy rather than requiring the police to hold their tongues and letting the chips fall as they may.

While policy favors allowing the police to give the defendant the opportunity to cooperate and avoid possible property destruction, the more important aspect of the issue is whether a Miranda warning is required prior to offering the opportunity to cooperate and what happens if a Miranda warning is not given prior to the offer.....

Superior Court 4/18/2008 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LEKEYIA GRAHAME

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LEKEYIA GRAHAME
No. 3288 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 73 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 4/18/2008
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of November 9, 2006 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal, No. CP-51-CR-0511061-2006
Before: STEVENS, KLEIN and KELLY, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
Dissenting Opinion by: KELLY, J.
Lekeyia Grahame appeals from the judgment of sentence entered against her following a bench trial on September 29, 2006. Grahame was found guilty of simple possession and possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to 4 years’ probation. Grahame argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because there was no valid consent to search her pocketbook, and no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Superior Court 1/4/08 - COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BONNIE DEAN

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BONNIE DEAN
No. 2698 EDA 2006 2008 PA Super 3 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 1/4/2008
Appeal from the Order September 11, 2006,In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County,Criminal Division at No. CP-13-CR-0000707-2005.
Before: LALLY-GREEN, BOWES and POPOVICH, JJ.
Opinion by: POPOVICH, J.
The Commonwealth appeals the order granting a motion to suppress filed by Appellee Bonnie Dean on grounds that: (1) the narcotic agents had probable cause to make a warrantless entry into Appellee’s hotel room; and (2) the entry was consensual, which vitiated the need to obtain a search warrant and validated seizure of the evidence therefrom. We affirm.