DIANE BLACK v. LABOR READY, INC., WILLIAMSPORT STEEL CONTAINER CORP. and RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.

DIANE BLACK v. LABOR READY, INC., WILLIAMSPORT STEEL CONTAINER CORP. and RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. No. 312 MDA 2009 2010 PA Super 72 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 4/26/2010
	Appeal from the Order of February 9, 2009, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Civil Division at No. 06-01679
Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., FREEDBERG and COLVILLE, JJ.
Opinion by: COLVILLE, J.
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. More specifically, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision to grant Appellee Williamsport Steel Container Corporation’s (“Appellee”) motion for summary judgment. We vacate the judgment and reverse the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee.

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RODERICK KULIK AND ANITA KULIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROSE MASH

RODERICK KULIK AND ANITA KULIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROSE MASH No. 1171 WDA 2008 2009 PA Super 188 Atlantic: 982 A.2d 85 Filed: 9/16/2009
	Appeal from the Order entered June 9, 2008 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil, No. GD-07-018275
Before: KLEIN, ALLEN and COLVILLE*, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
Roderick Kulik appeals from the Order granting Rose Mash’s summary judgment on the ground that the claim is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. We agree with the ruling of the trial judge, the Honorable Paul F. Lutty, Jr., and affirm.

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Superior Court - MARTON MINTO v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC. MARTON MINTO v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., AND J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC.

MARTON MINTO v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC. MARTON MINTO v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC., AND J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC. No. 43 EDA 2008 2009 PA Super 73 Atlantic: 971 A.2d 1280 Filed: 4/17/2009
	Appeal from the Order entered December 6, 2007 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil, No. 03528 April Term, 2003, No. 1029 October Term, 2003
Before: LALLY-GREEN, KLEIN and GANTMAN, JJ.
Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
Concurring Opinion by: GANTMAN, J.
Marton Minto suffered catastrophic injuries including quadriplegia when a truck he was driving, in his role as an employee of J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., went off the road on Interstate I-95 in Pennsylvania south of Philadelphia. In his complaint, Minto alleged that because his employer, J.B. Hunt, negligently destroyed and failed to preserve key parts of the truck, including the seatbelts, the brakes themselves, “black boxes” that monitored the action of the anti-lock brakes and motor, and other items, he was prejudiced in his tort suit against third parties who manufactured the truck and its components. The trial court judge granted J.B. Hunt’s judgment on the pleadings, finding that all of Minto’s claims against J.B. Hunt were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”), 77 P.S. § 481(a).

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Superior Court 7/7/08 - UNITED PARCEL SERVICE AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MARK HOHIDER

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. MARK HOHIDER
No. 1596 WDA 2007 2008 PA Super 148 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/7/2008
Appeal from the Order Entered July 27, 2007 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at No. 1723 of 2007
Before: KLEIN, BENDER and POPOVICH, JJ.
Opinion by: BENDER, J.
Dissenting Opinion by: KLEIN, J.
United Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (collectively “Employer”) appeal from the order dated and entered on July 27, 2007, that granted Mark Hohider’s (“Claimant”) motion to strike the judgment entered against Claimant on the common pleas docket by Employer. The order that formed the basis for the judgment was issued by a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) directing Claimant to pay Employer $67,223.23 in satisfaction of Employer’s subrogation lien on a portion of the amount received by Claimant in a third-party action. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

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¶ 7 Our review of Employer’s praecipe to enter judgment reveals that it
cited two sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), namely, Section
428 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 921, and Section 319 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 671, to
support its entry of judgment against Claimant for failure to “disgorge to
employer $67,223.23 in satisfaction of employer’s subrogation lien.” WCJ’s
Order, 12/19/06.
¶ 8 “Section 319 of the Act authorizes an employer to be reimbursed for
compensation benefits paid to an injured employee from the award of
damages recovered by that employee from a third party for the work-related
injury.” Kidd-Parker v. W.C.A.B. (Phila. Sch. Dist.), 907 A.2d 33, 37
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2007). “[A]s a
general principle of law, the employer’s subrogation rights are statutorily
absolute and can be abrogated only by choice.” Id. at 40 (quoting Winfree
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 554 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa. 1989)). The Kidd-
Parker opinion further explained that:
The purpose of this subrogation is threefold: it prevents double
recovery for the same injury; it relieves the employer of liability
occasioned by the negligence of a third party; and it prevents a
third party from escaping liability for his negligence. Dale
Manufacturing Co. v. Bressi, 491 Pa. 493, 421 A.2d 653
(1980). Section 319 is clear and unambiguous; is written in
mandatory terms; and admits no exceptions, equitable or
otherwise. Thompson v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board (USF&G Co.), 566 Pa. 420, 781 A.2d 1146 (2001). The
employer’s right to subrogation under Section 319 is automatic,
and it is absolute. Winfree v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 520
Pa. 392, 554 A.2d 485 (1989).
Id. at 37. Accordingly, we conclude that Employer has the absolute right to
subrogation pursuant to Section 319 of the Act. Moreover, the parties
stipulated to the sum due Employer during the proceedings before the WCJ.