| JUDITH MOORE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DONNIE R. MOORE, DECEASED, AND IN HER OWN RIGHT v. ERICSSON, INC. (SUCCESSOR TO ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE COMPANY), AMTCO/AMERICAN BILTRITE, CBS CORPORATION, CERTAINTEED CORPORATION, CHAMPLAIN CABLE CORPORATION, CLEAVER-BROOKS, INC., CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC., DFT, RPM, BONDEX INTERNATIONAL AND GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER CO., DFT, RPM, BONDEX INTERNATIONAL, FOSTER-WHEELER, LLC, GARLOCK SEALING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, CY GOLDBERG, INGERSOLL-RAND, GEORGIA PACIFIC, MELRATH GASKET COMPANY, METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE, OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., RILEY POWER, INC., UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION AND KELLY-MOORE PAINT CO., Appellants No. 2112 EDA 2009 2010 PA Super 173 Atlantic: n/a Petition for Reargument Filed 10/1/2010 Filed: 9/17/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Order entered June 4, 2009 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, No. 001441 October Term, 2006 | |
| Before: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and FREEDBERG, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: LAZARUS, J. | |
| In this asbestos personal injury action, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Ericsson, Inc. (Defendant/Ericsson) and Cross-Appellant/Appellee Judith Moore, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Donnie R. Moore, Deceased (Plaintiffs/Moore), appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying Ericsson’s post-trial motions and entering judgment on the molded jury verdict in the amount of $1,190,654.00 in favor of Moore. We affirm. | |
Showing posts with label Personal Injury. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Personal Injury. Show all posts
Friday, September 17, 2010
JUDITH MOORE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DONNIE R. MOORE, DECEASED, AND IN HER OWN RIGHT v. ERICSSON, INC. (SUCCESSOR TO ANACONDA WIRE AND CABLE
Friday, May 14, 2010
YVONNE CATROPPA v. AMANDA CARLTON
| YVONNE CATROPPA v. AMANDA CARLTON No. 404 WDA 2009 2010 PA Super 85 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 5/14/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment February 23, 2009 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No. 11380 of 2006 | |
| Before: BENDER, PANELLA and OTT, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: BENDER, J. | |
| Amanda Carlton (Appellant) appeals from judgment entered in favor of Yvonne Catroppa (Appellee) following the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment in her personal injury action against Appellant arising from a car accident involving the parties. Appellant claims that the trial court erred in determining that Appellee was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that Appellant was collaterally estopped from disputing the amount of Appellee’s damages, which had been established at a prior arbitration proceeding. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. | |
Friday, April 30, 2010
BRUCE AND MARY ANN MONTAGAZZI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF MATTHEW MONTAGAZZI, A MINOR v. NICHOLAS CRISCI, A MINOR,
| BRUCE AND MARY ANN MONTAGAZZI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF MATTHEW MONTAGAZZI, A MINOR v. NICHOLAS CRISCI, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH JENNIFER CRISCI, HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; BRYAN BACHMAN, A MINOR; RYAN DERBAUM, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH SHELLY DERBAUM, HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; AND JIMMY JOE PRATTE, A MINOR BY AND THROUGH JAMES PRATTE, HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM No. 1055 WDA 2009 2010 PA Super 78 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 4/30/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Order Entered May 29, 2009 In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No. 11367-2007 | |
| Before: BENDER, PANELLA and OTT, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: BENDER, J. | |
| Bruce and Mary Ann Montagazzi, Individually and as the Parents and Natural Guardians of Matthew Montagazzi, a Minor, appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants on claims that they were negligent in failing to warn or prevent Matthew Montagazzi from lighting the fuse of an improvised explosive device that he and the minor defendants created. Detonation of the device amputated portions of several fingers on Matthew’s right hand. The trial court concluded that the minor defendants owed Matthew no duty and, in the alternative, found that Matthew had assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law. We concur in the trial court’s assessment and, accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. | |
Monday, April 26, 2010
MICHELLE GORMLEY v. COTY EDGAR
| MICHELLE GORMLEY v. COTY EDGAR No. 50 EDA 2009 2010 PA Super 71 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 4/26/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Order Entered December 4, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at No. JUNE TERM 2007 NO. 002496. | |
| Before: BOWES, GANTMAN, and KELLY, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: BOWES, J. | |
| Michelle Gormley appeals from the December 4, 2008 order compelling her to provide an executed consent for release of certain mental health records. We affirm. | |
Thursday, February 25, 2010
MARY KAY SEDLACEK, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF EDWARD SEDLACEK, AND MARY KAY SEDLACEK IN HER OWN RIGHT v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION, A.W.
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Friday, January 29, 2010
JAMES CHARLES KIAK v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION
| JAMES CHARLES KIAK v. CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION No. 3033 EDA 2007 2010 PA Super 13 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 1/29/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Order Entered October 24, 2007. in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil No., October Term, 2000 No. 3340 | |
| Before: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, BENDER, BOWES, PANELLA, DONOHUE, SHOGAN AND ALLEN; JJ. | |
| Opinion by: MUSMANNO, J. | |
| James Charles Kiak (“Kiak”) appeals from the Order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Crown Equipment Corporation (“Crown”) in this product liability action. The trial court concluded that this case is controlled by the decision of a panel of this Court in Arnoldy v. Forklift L.P., 927 A.2d 257 (Pa. Super. 2007), and the principles of federal preemption. In Arnoldy, a panel of this Court concluded that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et seq., and regulations adopted pursuant to the OSH Act, preempted a similar state tort law claim. We hereby overrule Arnoldy, reverse the Order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. | |
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Friday, January 15, 2010
SHARON GRAHAM v. BERTULFO CAMPO
| SHARON GRAHAM v. BERTULFO CAMPO No. 3307 EDA 2008 2010 PA Super 5 2010 PA Super 5 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 1/15/2010 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 20, 2009 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): July Term, 2006, No. 0058 | |
| Before: STEVENS, BOWES, JJ., and McEWEN, P.J.E. | |
| Opinion by: STEVENS, J. | |
| This is an appeal from the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for Sharon Graham-Nutter (hereinafter “Graham”) in the amount of $204,247.79 in damages following the denial of post-trial motions filed by Bertulfo Campo (“Appellant”). We affirm. | |
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Wednesday, October 14, 2009
CHRYSTAL CAMPBELL v. EARL R. WALKER, JR. APPEAL OF: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
| CHRYSTAL CAMPBELL v. EARL R. WALKER, JR. APPEAL OF: DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE No. 1631 EDA 2008 2009 PA Super 198 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 10/14/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Order entered May 20, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Domestic Relations, No. 99-17726; Pacses No. 849101063 | |
| Before: BENDER, SHOGAN, JJ., and McEWEN, P.J.E. | |
| Opinion by: McEWEN, P.J.E. | |
| The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department, of Public Welfare (hereinafter DPW) has appealed from a Court of Common Pleas order that vacated a lien against proceeds that were due appellee, Earl R. Walker, Jr., from Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the settlement of a personal injury lawsuit. We reverse. | |
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Wednesday, September 16, 2009
RODERICK KULIK AND ANITA KULIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROSE MASH
| RODERICK KULIK AND ANITA KULIK, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ROSE MASH No. 1171 WDA 2008 2009 PA Super 188 Atlantic: 982 A.2d 85 Filed: 9/16/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Order entered June 9, 2008 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil, No. GD-07-018275 | |
| Before: KLEIN, ALLEN and COLVILLE*, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: KLEIN, J. | |
| Roderick Kulik appeals from the Order granting Rose Mash’s summary judgment on the ground that the claim is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. We agree with the ruling of the trial judge, the Honorable Paul F. Lutty, Jr., and affirm. | |
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Thursday, August 13, 2009
STUART ZEIDMAN v. ERIN FISHER AND TROY FISHER
| STUART ZEIDMAN v. ERIN FISHER AND TROY FISHER No. 3309 EDA 2008 2009 PA Super 161 Atlantic: 980 A.2d 637 Filed: 8/13/2009 | |
| Appeal from the Order dated October 17, 2008 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No. August Term, 2007, No. 0610 | |
| Before: KLEIN, BENDER and CLELAND, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: CLELAND, J. | |
| This case reminds us again of the utility of communication to prevent injury, even in the pastoral setting of a golf course and in the context of a game in which etiquette is as integral as skill. | |
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Friday, December 19, 2008
Superior Court - SARA JANE WEIBLE, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM WEIBLE, AND IN HER OWN RIGHT v. ALLIED SIGNAL, INC., AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., AMER
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Tuesday, December 16, 2008
Superior Court - DONNA BEDNAR, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES BEDNAR, AND WIDOW IN HER OWN RIGHT v. DANA CORPORATION
| DONNA BEDNAR, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES BEDNAR, AND WIDOW IN HER OWN RIGHT v. DANA CORPORATION No. 3503 EDA 2005 2008 PA Super 283 Atlantic: 962 A.2d 1232 Filed: 12/16/2008 | |
| Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 8, 2006, In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil at No. January Term, 2004, No. 2988 | |
| Before: BENDER, DONOHUE, and FREEDBERG, JJ. | |
| Opinion by: FREEDBERG, J. | |
| In this asbestos personal injury action, Appellant Donna Bednar, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her late husband James R. Bednar, appeals from judgment entered following a verdict in favor of Dana Corporation. We reverse and remand for a new trial. | |
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Friday, July 18, 2008
Superior Court 7/18/08 - APPEAL OF: SHERRY KASPRZYK
RACQUEL UNDERWOOD, A Minor by and Through Her Mother and Natural Guardian CATHERINE UNDERWOOD, SHAUNA McINNES, and ANDREW DASH v. DANA WIND, An Individual and SHERRY KASPRZYK, An Individual APPEAL OF: DANA WIND APPEAL OF: SHERRY KASPRZYK
No. 1502 & 1701 WDA 2007 2008 PA Super 158 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/18/2008
Appeal from the Judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, No(s): GD 04-007373
Before: BENDER, BOWES and TAMILIA, JJ.
Opinion by: TAMILIA, J.
On November 23, 2003, two pit bull dogs owned by appellant Dana Wind, escaped from the home she rented from her aunt, appellant Sherry Kasprzyk, and attacked the minor child, appellee Racquel Underwood, as well as the good Samaritans, appellees Shauna McInnes and Andrew Dash, who attempted to rescue the child. A jury entered awards of $65,000, $85,000, and $80,000, respectively, in favor of the appellees. On August 8, 2007, appellants’ post-trial motions were denied, and appellees’ request for delay damages was granted: Underwood was awarded an additional $8,724.25; McInnes was awarded $11,408.62; and Dash was awarded $10,737.53. On August 17, 2007, an aggregate judgment of $260,870.40 was entered in favor of appellees, that amount representing the total of the appellees’ awards and delay damages.
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The dangerous propensities of an animal may be established by a single incident of an attack on a human being. You may determine prior knowledge of the possible dangerous propensities of an animal by direct and/or circumstantial evidence.
In order to prove the vicious propensities of an animal, actual notice is not necessary. It is sufficient if one knew or should have known that the animal was a probable cause of harm.
Now, I told you that the law is a violation -- an unexcused violation of the dog law is negligence per se. And the dog law talks about dogs getting out. It used to be referred to as dogs running at large. Now it’s a different thing, but it’s the same concept. They need to be confined or on a leash or a chain. And it also defines what dangers dogs are and the negligence of keeping a dangerous dog. Pennsylvania’s dog law, which is a state law in effect at the time this harm occurred, provided in
part that it is unlawful for the owner or keeper of any dog to fail to keep at all times such dog confined within the premises of the owner. This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as Defendants. If you find that there was a violation of this state law, you must find Defendant negligent as a matter of law.
However, before you answer that, you need to determine whether the negligence was a factual cause of the injuries. Now, that’s with respect to the dog getting out. The Pennsylvania dog law, which is a state law in effect at the time this harm occurred, provided in part that when a dog owner’s dog has inflicted severe injury on a human being without provocation, the dangerous propensities of the animal are established by a single incident of attacking the human being. This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as the Defendants.
Pennsylvania’s dog law, a state law in effect at the time, provides in part that the owner or keeper of any dog that aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death of any human through the intentional, reckless or negligent conduct of the dog’s owner has violated the Pennsylvania dog law.
This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as the Defendants. And again, in all three of those instances you need to find that the fact -- that that violation was a factual cause of the injury.
Now, I talked to you about -- in the law remember I told you it says an unexcused violation? An excuse means a reasonable explanation for why the act occurred acceptable to a reasonable person under all the facts and circumstances in the case. And it’s the burden of the person offering that excuse to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.
No. 1502 & 1701 WDA 2007 2008 PA Super 158 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/18/2008
Appeal from the Judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, No(s): GD 04-007373
Before: BENDER, BOWES and TAMILIA, JJ.
Opinion by: TAMILIA, J.
On November 23, 2003, two pit bull dogs owned by appellant Dana Wind, escaped from the home she rented from her aunt, appellant Sherry Kasprzyk, and attacked the minor child, appellee Racquel Underwood, as well as the good Samaritans, appellees Shauna McInnes and Andrew Dash, who attempted to rescue the child. A jury entered awards of $65,000, $85,000, and $80,000, respectively, in favor of the appellees. On August 8, 2007, appellants’ post-trial motions were denied, and appellees’ request for delay damages was granted: Underwood was awarded an additional $8,724.25; McInnes was awarded $11,408.62; and Dash was awarded $10,737.53. On August 17, 2007, an aggregate judgment of $260,870.40 was entered in favor of appellees, that amount representing the total of the appellees’ awards and delay damages.
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-----------------------------------------------------
The dangerous propensities of an animal may be established by a single incident of an attack on a human being. You may determine prior knowledge of the possible dangerous propensities of an animal by direct and/or circumstantial evidence.
In order to prove the vicious propensities of an animal, actual notice is not necessary. It is sufficient if one knew or should have known that the animal was a probable cause of harm.
Now, I told you that the law is a violation -- an unexcused violation of the dog law is negligence per se. And the dog law talks about dogs getting out. It used to be referred to as dogs running at large. Now it’s a different thing, but it’s the same concept. They need to be confined or on a leash or a chain. And it also defines what dangers dogs are and the negligence of keeping a dangerous dog. Pennsylvania’s dog law, which is a state law in effect at the time this harm occurred, provided in
part that it is unlawful for the owner or keeper of any dog to fail to keep at all times such dog confined within the premises of the owner. This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as Defendants. If you find that there was a violation of this state law, you must find Defendant negligent as a matter of law.
However, before you answer that, you need to determine whether the negligence was a factual cause of the injuries. Now, that’s with respect to the dog getting out. The Pennsylvania dog law, which is a state law in effect at the time this harm occurred, provided in part that when a dog owner’s dog has inflicted severe injury on a human being without provocation, the dangerous propensities of the animal are established by a single incident of attacking the human being. This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as the Defendants.
Pennsylvania’s dog law, a state law in effect at the time, provides in part that the owner or keeper of any dog that aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death of any human through the intentional, reckless or negligent conduct of the dog’s owner has violated the Pennsylvania dog law.
This state law dictates the duty of care required of someone in the same situation as the Defendants. And again, in all three of those instances you need to find that the fact -- that that violation was a factual cause of the injury.
Now, I talked to you about -- in the law remember I told you it says an unexcused violation? An excuse means a reasonable explanation for why the act occurred acceptable to a reasonable person under all the facts and circumstances in the case. And it’s the burden of the person offering that excuse to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Superior Court - ANDREA LANE vs. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND ......
NDREA LANE vs. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND NESHAMINY CONSTRUCTORS, INC. AND JAMES J. ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND JOSEPH B. FAY, CO.APPEAL OF: NESHAMINY CONSTRUCTORS, INC.
No. 1679 EDA 2007 2008 PA Super 157 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/17/2008
Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2007, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at,No. February Term, 2005, No. 001880.
Before: BOWES, SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD, JJ.
Opinion by: BOWES, J.
In this appeal, Neshaminy Constructors, Inc., Appellant, seeks indemnification from James J. Anderson Construction Co., Appellee, for the verdict entered against Appellant and in favor of Andrea Lane (“Plaintiff”) in this personal injury action. Application of controlling case law to the jury’s resolution of this action compels the conclusion that Appellant is not entitled to indemnification from Appellee. We therefore affirm.
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No. 1679 EDA 2007 2008 PA Super 157 Atlantic: n/a Filed: 7/17/2008
Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2007, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at,No. February Term, 2005, No. 001880.
Before: BOWES, SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD, JJ.
Opinion by: BOWES, J.
In this appeal, Neshaminy Constructors, Inc., Appellant, seeks indemnification from James J. Anderson Construction Co., Appellee, for the verdict entered against Appellant and in favor of Andrea Lane (“Plaintiff”) in this personal injury action. Application of controlling case law to the jury’s resolution of this action compels the conclusion that Appellant is not entitled to indemnification from Appellee. We therefore affirm.
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